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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent ; 
vs. 
MARK R. THURSTON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
>. Case No. 880593-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment after 
two second degree felony convictions. Jurisdiction of this Court 
is therefore conferred by 78-2a-3 (2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant having been charged with various crimes all 
of which were felonies in two separate informations, negotiated 
with the State through the Davis County Attorney's Office to 
allow him to plead guilty to two second degree felony counts of 
distribution of controlled substances. In exchange for the 
guilty pleas the State aareed to recommended probation to the 
sentencing Court. 
At the time of the sentencing the County Attorney's 
Office did recommend probation; however, Davis County Deputy 
Sherrif Lon Brian the investigating Officer, recommended that the 
appellant be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. His 
recommendation as noted by the Court was made in the strongest 
possible terms with the investigating Officer saying: "Fifteen 
years is not long enough for this Defendant". 
At the time of sentencing, the appellant objected to 
the statement provided by Lon Brian and requested that the Court 
disregard that statement. The Court refused to disregard the 
recommendation of the Police Officer and indicated at the time of 
sentencing that the statement provided by Lon Brian did have an 
"impact" upon him and he was "influenced by that information" in 
sentencing the defendant to prison. The District Court then 
sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term in the Utah 
State Prison from 1 to 15 years. 
Appellant, feeling that the bargain that he had reached 
with the State had been breached, moved to set aside his guilty 
plea or for resentencing (specific performance of the agreement) 
on the basis that the plea bargain he had entered into had been 
broken by the State, arguing that the State must be speak with 
one voice in terms of plea bargaining. He further asserted that 
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it makes a sham of the plea bargaining process to allow the State 
to agree to a certain bargain and then allow the investigating 
Officer to circumvent the negotiated bargain by taking a position 
exactly opposite to that of the State's official position as 
reflected by the County Attorney's Office. 
The Court denied appellant's Motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea or for resentencing, and from that Order appellant 
appealed. 
In a separate proceeding the District Court granted 
appellant a Certificate of Probable Cause and the appellant is 
currently free on an Appeal Bond. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I 
POINT II 
POINT III 
DID THE STATE BREACH THE PLEA 
BARGAIN IN VIEW OF INCONSISTENT 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY 
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER? 
IS THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER BOUND 
BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A 
PLEA BARGAIN BETWEEN A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT AND THE STATE BY AND 
THROUGH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE? 
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
VOLUNTARY IN VIEW OF THE ILLUSORY 
NATURE OF THE STATE PROMISE AND THE 
DEFENDANT'S EXAGGERATED BELIEF IN 
THE BENEFIT OF THE PLEA? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The controlling statutes, constitutional provisions 
etc., have been reproduced verbatim in the Addendum to this brief 
and they are as follows: 
There are no Determinative Constitutional Provisions, 
Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
lc Nature of the case. Appellant was convicted of two 
second degree felonies and sentenced to the Utah State Prison on 
those convictions for an indeterminate term of 1-15 years on a 
guilty plea which he unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw, and it 
is from that Order denying his Motion to Set Aside the Guilty 
Plea that he appeals. 
2. Course of proceedings. Appellant was convicted of 
two second degree felonies and sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
on those convictions of an indeterminate term of 1-15 years on a 
guilty plea which he unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw, and it 
is from that Order denying his Motion to Set Aside the guilty 
plea that he appeals. 
3. Disposition of trial court. Appellant was 
convicted of two second degree felonies and sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison on those convictions of an indeterminate term of 1-
15 years on a guilty plea which he unsuccessfully attempted to 
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withdraw, and it is from that Order denying his motion to Set 
Aside the guilty plea that he appeals. 
4. Relevant facts. At appellant's change of plea 
hearing the County Attorney representing the State had this to 
say: 
"and then we have some sentencing recommendations that 
we've agreed to enter into as well. . .basically Your 
Honor this is a first offense. The State has looked 
over the file in the situation and the State is 
prepared to recommend that Mr. Thurston be place on 
probation rather than any type of incarceration. That 
would be our recommendation." (Tr of hearing 8/17/88 
p.p. 2-3) 
At the time of sentencing the defendant had an 
opportunity for the first time to review the presentence report 
that was prepared by Adult Probation and Parole in which the 
Officer recommended in the strongest terms possible that the 
defendant be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. (Tr. of 
Hearing 8/17/88 p. 1-4.) 
At that same hearing the defendant objected to the 
Court considering the recommendation of the police officer and 
asked the Court to disregard that recommendation in pronouncing 
sentence. The Court indicated that it was "impressed' by what 
the recommendation of the police officer was. (Tr. of Hearing 
8/17/88 page 9.) 
The Court reaffirmed that the officer had recommended 
15 years in Prison as not being long enough for the defendant. 
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(Tr. of hearing at page 9) 
Appellant feeling that the bargain that he had reached 
with the State had been breached moved to set aside his guilty 
plea of for resentencing on the basis that the plea bargain he 
had entered into had been broken or breached by the State. He 
argued unsuccessfully that in terms of negotiating with a 
criminal defendant the State must speak with one voice in terms 
of plea bargaining and by law that voice is the County Attorney 
or the Prosecuting Attorney. He further asserted that it makes a 
sham of the plea bargaining process to allow the State to agree 
to a certain bargain by and through the County Attorney's Office 
and them allow another agency of the State i.e. the investigating 
officer to circumvent the negotiated bargain by taking a position 
exactly opposite to that of County Attorney's Office, or the 
representative of the State. (Tr. of hearing 9/27/88 P.P. 7-12.) 
The Court denied appellant's Motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea or for resentencing in an Order dated October 7, 1988 
and it is from that Order that appellant filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State breached the plea bargain with appel lant by 
t a k i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s e n t e n c i n g 
recommendations one of which was made by the County A t t o r n e y ' s 
Off ice and the o t h e r of which was made by the i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
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officer- These sentencing positions were completely at odds with 
one another- The County Attorney as the attorney for the State 
recommended probation. The investigating officer as part of the 
"prosecution team" recommended Prison in the strongest possible 
terms. Since the bargain was breached appellant should be 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. 
The Police Officer investigating a case and working as 
part of the "prosecution's team" is bound by the terms and 
conditions of a plea bargain between a criminal defendant and the 
State. The State should be required to consult with the 
investigative agency involved in a case before it extends any 
offer to a criminal defendant, and once that offer is extended it 
should be binding upon the investigating agency. 
Appellant's guilty plea was not voluntary in view of 
the illusory promise of probation and the appellant' s 
exaggerated belief in the benefit of the plea, in view of the 
investigating officer's contrary recommendation to the sentencing 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE STATE BREACHED THE PLEA BARGAIN 
IN VIEW OF INCONSISTENT SENTENCING 
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER. 
Appellant should be entitled to withdraw his guilty 
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plea because the plea bargain that he entered into with the State 
was breached by the State in taking inconsistent positions 
regarding an important aspect of the bargain. 
The United States Supreme Court in Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971) has dealt with the issue 
of a plea bargain which was not kept. In Santobello, the defen-
dant, after having negotiated with the prosecutor, withdrew his 
previously entered not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea 
based upon the prosecutor having agreed to make no recommendation 
at the time of sentencing. At the defendant's sentencing hearing 
held several months later, a new prosecutor recommended the 
maximum sentence. The defendant then attempted unsuccessfully to 
withdraw his guilty plea and his conviction was affirmed on 
appeal in the State court. The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to 
the State court for further consideration. The Supreme Court in 
remanding the case back to the State had the following to say 
about plea bargain arrangements at 92 S.Ct. 499: 
This phase of the process of criminal justice, and 
the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea 
of guilty must be attended by safeguards to assure the 
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. 
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is 
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can 
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled. (Emphasis added.) 
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In the case at bar, appellant contends that it makes 
very little sense for the State, through its authorized represen-
tative, i.e., the County Attorney's Office, to agree to a par-
ticular recommendation when an agency working under its direction 
can circumvent that agreement and recommend, as in this case, the 
harshest possible sentence in the strongest possible words. The 
appellant negotiated the plea agreement with the State of Utah, 
by and through its legal representative, the County Attorney's 
Office. In that negotiation, it was felt important to acquire 
the recommendation of the State that the appellant be given 
probation. It is appellant's position that that recommendation 
binds the State and the investigating officer. A violation of 
that agreement occurs when an agency of the State recommends 
something other than what was negotiated. 
Utah has followed the Santobello precedent in State v. 
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 ( Utah 1976) where the prosecutor promised 
to recommend probation to the sentencing Judge. On appeal the 
defendant claimed that the State had not fulfilled it's promise. 
This court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the recommendation had been included in the 
probation report. The Supreme Court held that if it had not been 
included the defendant was "entitled to have his sentence set 
aside and to be resentenced with the benefit of his bargain." 
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The Utah Supreme Court cited with the approval the Santobello 
principle and remanded the case back to the trial court for a 
hearing to determine whether or not the sentencing Judge had the 
benefit of the States recommendation for probation at the time of 
sentencing. This was what the defendant had bargained for in 
Garfield and the Supreme Court held that the State was bound by 
that bargain. 
POINT II AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER IS BOUND 
BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A 
PLEA BARGAIN BETWEEN A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT AND THE STATE OF UTAH AS 
NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT 
AND THE COUNTY ATTORNEY WHO 
REPRESENTS THE STATE OF UTAH. 
As provided in 77-1-5 Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended) a criminal action for violation of the State statute, 
such has occurred in this case, is to be prosecuted in the name 
of the State of Utah. The State of Utah in that criminal 
prosecution is represented by either the Attorney Generals Office 
or one of the various County Attorney's Offices throughout the 
State. 
As provided for in 77-2-1 Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as 
amended) no information is to be filed charging a class A 
misdemeanor or above without having first been authorized by a 
prosecuting attorney. And the commencement of prosecution means 
the filing of an information or an indictment which has been 
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authorized for filing by the prosecuting attorney. 
The entire criminal justice system from the State's 
point of view is overseen and controlled by a prosecuting 
attorney. A criminal defendant in negotiating a case deals with 
a prosecuting attorney and the statements made by the prosecuting 
attorney are authorized statements made by the state in connect-
ion with a criminal prosecution. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Shibata, 678 P.2d 
785 (Utah 1984) in ruling upon a possible violation of a 
discovery order in withholding exculpatory evidence, held 
essentially that knowledge possessed by the police officers is 
charged to the prosecutor where it said at 678 P.2d 788: 
At the outset, we stress that we are concerned with 
more that the prosecutor's state of knowledge regarding 
the sale of cocaine or other drug activity by the 
witness. Information known to police officers working 
in a case is charged to the prosecution since the 
officers are a part of the prosecution team. (some 
emphasis added.) 
As the Shibata case held, there is a prosecutor's team 
which includes not only the prosecuting attorney, but the 
officers investigating the case. Knowledge possessed by one is 
knowledge possessed by the other. In the case at bar, recommend-
ations made by one, i.e., the prosecutor, is a recommendation 
made by that prosecuting team, including the investigating 
officer. 
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It would simply make a sham and mockery of the criminal 
justice system for this Court to impliedlly authorize police 
officers to disregard recommendations made by the prosecuting 
attorney or in other words the attorney for a party to the law 
suit, when that same officer is part of the prosecuting team. It 
would be similar to a defendant retaining a law firm to represent 
him and allowing two attorney's from that law firm to negotiate 
conflicting agreements regarding a plea bargain and then force 
the State to be bound by the most lenient of those bargains. 
Certainly if a defendant attempted to negotiate directly with the 
Attorney General's Office and circumvent the County Attorney's 
Office in connection with the case that would not occur. 
Certainly the Attorney General's Office could not appear at the 
sentencing hearing and circumvent a bargain that was reached 
between the defendant and the State, through the local County 
Attorney's Office. 
It is clear that trial courts need direction and 
criminal defendant's need assurances that the States speaks with 
one voice and is that voice is the prosecuting attorney and that 
everyone involved in the prosecution of the case is bound by that 
one voice. 
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POINT III APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT 
VOLUNTARY IN VIEW IF THE ILLUSORY 
NATURE OF THE PROMISE THAT THE 
STATE MADE IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS 
GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE APPELLANT 
HAD AN EXAGGERATED BELIEF IN THE 
BENEFIT OF THE PLEA. IE., A 
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROBATION. 
It is clear from the record that the appellant relied 
upon the recommendation of the State that he receive probation. 
It is certainly true that that recommendation is not binding upon 
the Court nor is it binding upon Adult Probation and Parole, 
however, a recommendation is a recommendation and it was the 
recommendation of the State. His reliance upon that recommend-
ation was misplaced and hence his guilty plea involuntarily 
entered because of the inconsistent positions taken by the 
investigating agency and the Prosecuting Attorney's Office. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Copeland, 97 adv. 
rep. 3, 9, (Utah 1988) considered a case involving "illusory 
promises" or those promises which either the State cannot or will 
not be able to fulfill. In Copeland, the defendant entered a 
guilty plea based upon the apparent State recommendation for 
hospitalization when under the statute that he was charged under 
a minimum mandatory prison sentence was the only possibility, 
there the court said: 
The record suggests the possibility that defendant did 
not understand the value of the commitments made to 
him. If the State promised to recommend hospitaliza-
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tion rather that a prison sentence of if the defendant 
understood this to be the promise, then he "pled with 
an exaggerated belief in the benefits of his plea," 
and he should be allowed to withdraw his plea.... 
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to affirm the 
continued vitality of Santobello v. New York, (supra) in Utah. 
The record suggests the possibility that 
defendant did not understand the value of the 
commitments made to him. If the State promised to 
recommend hospitalization rather than a prison 
sentence or if defendant understood this to be the 
promise, then he "pled with an exaggerated belief 
in the benefits of his plea," and he should be allowed 
to withdraw his plea.... 
Finally, we address the fact that the State may 
not have fulfilled the promise that it made to defen-
dant. The trial judge suggested at the sentencing 
hearing that even if the State did not keep its promise 
to recommend a sentence, defendant would not be allowed 
to withdraw his plea because he was informed at the 
arraignment of the conseguences of the crime and that 
the recommendations were not binding on the court. We 
have difficulty with the court's suggestion that the 
State's failure to keep its promise would be of no 
consequence. 
Because of the confusion associated with whether or not 
the defendant in Copeland relied upon an illusory promise to 
induce him to plead guilty, the Supreme Court remanded the case 
back to the District Court with instructions to determine the 
exact recommendation promised by the State, the defendant's 
understanding of that promise, and whether the State fulfilled 
its promise, concluding: 
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If it is found as a matter of fact either that the 
State promised to recommend commitment to the Utah 
State Hospital or that defendant understood this to be 
the promise without knowing that it was without value 
or that the State did not fulfill its promise, 
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea. 
In the case at bar, the defendant clearly relied upon 
the State's recommendation for probation in entering his guilty 
plea. He does not contend that this recommendation is binding 
upon the Court; it simply is not. However, he does contend that 
the recommendation made by the State through the County Attor-
ney's Office, its legal spokesperson, is binding upon the State 
and binds all those involved in the prosecution. To rule 
otherwise would reduce the concept of plea bargaining to a sham 
and mockery. Certainly, if a police officer is free to recommend 
prison in the strongest possible terms notwithstanding the 
State's recommendation for probation, then in this particular 
case the recommendation was clearly "illusory" as outlined in 
Copeland, supra, and for that reason, if for no other reason, 
appellant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or for 
specific performance of the plea agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial courts Order denying the appellant's Motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea or in the alternative force specific 
enforcement of the plea bargain should be reversed and this case 
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remanded back to the District Court for trial or inforcement of 
the bargain 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1989. 
BROWN & COX 
By AU^^-T^ /< /?A 
Kenneth R. Brown 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 1989 I 
mailed a true and correct cpoy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief 
was mailed to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Postage prepaid. 
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